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O
nline games are one of the most popular In-
ternet applications, but cheating has emerged 
as a notable phenomenon in current game-
play on the Internet. However, such cheat-
ing isn’t as well understood as we might expect. 
To address this lack of knowledge, we looked at 
various known cheating methods and de"ned a tax-
onomy of online game cheating with respect to under-
lying vulnerability (What is exploited?), consequence 
(What type of failure can be achieved?), and the cheat-
ing principal (Who is cheating?). This taxonomy sys-
tematically introduces cheat characteristics in online 
games and describes how they can arise. We intend it 
to be comprehensible and useful not only to security 
specialists but also to game developers, operators, and 
players who are less knowledgeable and experienced in 
security. We presented a preliminary version of this ar-
ticle elsewhere1 that signi"cantly extended our previ-
ous work2; here, we present a further re"ned version.
Security in Computer Games: 
An Overview
Over the years, security has played varying roles in 
di#erent games, ranging from early mainframe-based 
games through arcade, console, and PC games to the 
latest online games. The evolution of security re-
quirements in these games con"rms the well-known 
observation that security can mean di#erent things in 
di#erent application contexts.
Security in Mainframe, 
Arcade, and PC Games
Although security started becoming an issue for com-
puter scientists in the 1960s, it was 
a concern only for operating system 
designers. No real security considerations were spe-
ci"c to computer games, which were mainly placed 
on the mainframe at the time.
The only plausible exception known to us was 
a unique access control feature implemented in the 
Cambridge Multiple Access System at Cambridge 
University in the mid 1960s. This feature controlled 
access to data via the identity of the program being 
used for access as well as—or instead of—through user 
identity. Examples using this unusual feature included 
the league table "le, which “recorded people’s relative 
standing in a competitive guessing game, which was 
accessible to the game program only” (Roger Need-
ham, personal communication, Oct. 2002).
Coin-operated arcade games emerged in the 1970s, 
and the physical security of coin boxes locked in the 
arcade game machines was a major security concern. 
People tackled this issue by using safer boxes and put-
ting game machines in trustworthy or guarded places.
As with other content-critical industries, such as 
music or video, when content piracy issues expanded 
to threatening levels, copy protection became impor-
tant, especially for PC games. From the beginning 
(the 1980s), PC games were especially vulnerable to 
piracy because they were typically shipped on standard 
removable storage media, such as $oppy disks or CD-
ROMs. Game companies adopted many diskette- or 
CD-ROM-based copy protection techniques for 
their games but achieved only mixed success, given 
that copy protection is a coevolutionary war between 
guardians and crackers.
Cheating is rampant in current gameplay on the Internet 
but not well understood. In this article, the authors 
summarize various known cheating methods and de"ne 
a taxonomy for online game cheating to help security 
experts and game developers alike.
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Security in Console Games
Manufacturers also developed copy protection mech-
anisms for console games. However, console-game 
vendors’ security e#orts have been directed toward 
locking customers in to their hardware and making 
strategic plays in the market. 
Nintendo appears to be the "rst console vendor to 
adopt security techniques for this purpose3 and intro-
duced practices that de"ne the game-console industry 
to this day. 
The security system that Nintendo introduced to 
its consoles implemented a simple lock-and-key con-
cept. Each authentic Nintendo console and cartridge 
contained a security chip, and these chips communi-
cated via a shared secret key. As long as the chip in 
the console and another in the cartridge were com-
municating, the system operated; otherwise, the sys-
tem froze up. In this way, a console would reject any 
non-Nintendo game cartridges; if a player inserted a 
Nintendo cartridge into a console that didn’t know 
the key, the game wouldn’t run either.
Nintendo protected its security chip via both 
copyright and patent; the industry referred to it as 
a “lock out” chip. No one could manufacture their 
own games for this platform without Nintendo’s ap-
proval. Nintendo used this advantage to enforce strict 
licensee agreements, censor games, and demand that it 
manufacture all cartridges for its console.
All this combined to make Nintendo the number 
one videogame manufacturer at the time—at its peak, 
it achieved a near-monopoly position in the industry, 
which it retained for nearly 10 years.3
Today, all major console vendors, including Mi-
crosoft and Sony, use security techniques to make 
strategic market plays, continuing the tradition Nin-
tendo initiated.
Security in Online Games
Online games’ emergence has not only changed the 
way people play games but has also led to fundamen-
tally changed security requirements for computer 
games. As (distributed) Internet applications, online 
games involve more complicated security issues than 
traditional computer games did, whereas some previ-
ous concerns present little problem.
For example, many online game vendors distribute 
their game software free, or with a symbolic fee, and 
charge users when they log in to play on the vendors’ 
servers. This lets vendors (more or less) bypass the tra-
ditional headache of copy protection.
Instead, security for online games includes secu-
rity for game-hosting systems in a networked envi-
ronment, and it also covers issues such as privacy and 
access control. For commercial online games, security 
also involves the payment mechanism. These issues 
are relatively well understood, however, because other 
Internet applications share them. 
Recent research has suggested that online cheat-
ing, on the other hand, represents an important new 
security concern for computer game design.2,4–6 This 
might seem like a surprising observation, but it’s a 
natural consequence of such games’ intrinsic proper-
ties. Interestingly, to get to this point, we had to wait 
almost 50 years after the appearance of the "rst com-
puter game—in fact, until people played computer 
games in the same way they played their counterparts 
in the nonelectronic world.
We can sum up the latest developments by saying 
that while people for the past 50 years tried to cheat 
the system, now they’re trying to cheat each other.
Cheating in Online Games
We adopt the following de"nition for cheating (which 
re"nes our earlier version2): 
Any behavior that a player uses to gain an advantage 
over his peer players or achieve a target in an online 
game is cheating if, according to the game rules or 
at the discretion of the game operator (that is, the 
game service provider, who is not necessarily the de-
veloper of the game), the advantage or the target is 
one that the player is not supposed to have achieved.
Several common forms of cheating exist, and they 
have some general properties.
Common Cheating Forms
We can classify common forms of cheating into 15 
categories. We’ve marked those speci"c to or of special 
relevance to online games with an asterisk. The others 
are generic to all network applications, although they 
might have di#erent names in di#erent contexts, such 
as “attacks” or “intrusions.” (See “Related Work in 
Creating Security Taxonomies” for more methods for 
classifying security concerns.)
A. Exploiting misplaced trust.* Many cheats involve 
tampering with game code, con"guration data, or 
both, on the client side.4 Cheaters can modify their 
game client program or data, then replace the old copy 
with the revised one for future use. Alternatively, they 
can modify or replace code and data on the $y. 
Cheaters can also tamper with their game client 
programs on the $y to access sensitive game states that 
are otherwise unavailable to players. Typical examples 
include the hacker program that displayed all army 
formation information in the popular Asian game 
Si Guo (or “Four States” in English),5 and the “map 
hack” that dishonest players often use to reveal unex-
plored map areas on the display in real-time strategy 
games such as Age of Empires. 
Such cheating occurs primarily due to misplaced 
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trust—developers place too much trust in the client 
side, which in reality can’t be trusted at all because 
cheating players have total control over their game cli-
ents. Countermeasures based on security-by-obscurity 
approaches, such as program obfuscation, eventually 
fail because they try to protect the wrong thing—that 
is, the game clients’ binary codes, which are in fact 
under the cheaters’ control. 
B. Collusion.* In online games, players can collude 
with each other to gain unfair advantages over their 
honest opponents. For example, so-called “win trad-
ing” was a collusion cheat widely seen in the popular 
StarCraft game, in which two cheaters colluded with 
each other as follows. Each lost to the other alter-
nately in a ladder competition. The loss that one took 
would give the other a victory point, raising his lad-
der rank, and vice versa. Thus, both of them could 
climb to top positions in the ladder without playing 
a legitimate game.
Collusion cheating has also been widely seen in 
online contract bridge, which is a four-person card 
gameplayed between two pairs of partners. Un-
like chess, in which all pieces are on the board and 
known to each side, bridge is a game with hidden 
information. Each player normally sees only a subset 
of all 52 cards during gameplay. However, by illic-
itly exchanging card information over the telephone, 
instant messenger, or the like, collusive cheaters can 
gain huge advantages over honest bridge players. We 
discuss this collusion cheat and various other collu-
sion scenarios, as well as their countermeasures, in 
earlier work.5
C. Abusing game procedure.* Players can carry out 
this form of cheating without any technical sophistica-
tion because the cheater simply abuses the game’s op-
erating procedure. One common case we’ve observed 
in many online games is escaping: cheaters disconnect 
themselves from the game system when they’re about 
to lose.
Another example is scoring cheating, which we ob-
served in the popular online Go community. When a 
game is "nished in Go, the players must identify and 
remove “dead” stones by hand before the system can 
determine which side wins. During this scoring pro-
cess, however, cheating players can stealthily remove 
their opponents’ “alive” stones, thus overturning the 
game result. (When each side’s territory is similar in 
size, cheated players might easily overlook the cheat, 
especially if they aren’t strong players.)
D. Cheating related to virtual assets.* In some on-
line games, players can trade virtual characters and 
items they’ve acquired for real money. A cheater 
might o#er a virtual item and receive real money for 
it, but never deliver it as agreed. 
E. Exploiting machine intelligence.* Cheating players 
can sometimes exploit arti"cial intelligence (AI) tech-
niques. For example, advances in computer chess re-
search have produced many programs that can compete 
S everal authors have attempted to de"ne a framework for classifying and understanding online game cheating. For 
example, Steven Davis categorized traditional forms of casino 
cheating and discussed their potential counterparts in online 
games.1 However, a casino isn’t representative enough to re#ect 
all forms of online game settings, in which cheating might occur 
with differing characteristics.
Matt Pritchard reported many real online cheating cases 
that have occurred in various games and classi"ed them into a 
six-category framework.2 However, his classi"cation is ad hoc 
and not comprehensive. Indeed, many online game cheats don’t 
readily "t into any of his categories.
Several papers investigate the de"nition of taxonomies for 
security vulnerabilities, attacks, or intrusions in a general setting. 
For example, Carl Landwehr and his colleagues constructed a 
classi"cation of security #aws in software with respect to genesis 
(How did the #aw enter the system?), time of introduction (When 
did it enter the system?), and location (Where in the system is it 
manifested?),3 but this classi"cation largely focused on #aws in 
operating systems. Gary McGraw presented a taxonomy of soft-
ware coding errors.4 Ulf Lindqvist and Erland Jonsson discussed 
the desired properties for a taxonomy and de"ned a taxonomy 
of intrusions with respect to intrusion techniques and results.5 
However, as we discuss in the main text, although a gameplayer 
can cheat by launching an attack or intrusion, cheating in online 
games can also have some unique manifestations.
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with human players at the master level. When play-
ing chess online with other human players, cheaters 
can look for the best candidates for their next move by 
stealthily running a strong computer chess program. 
This is cheating in this particular situation due to 
machine intelligence’s superiority over an ordinary 
human. It can occur in many other online games (in-
cluding online versions of traditional board and card 
games), depending on two factors: the game’s prop-
erties—that is, whether the game can be modeled as 
a computable problem—and the maturity of AI re-
search into such games. 
F. Modifying client infrastructure.* Without modi-
fying game programs, con"gurations, or data on the 
client side, players can cheat by modifying the client 
infrastructure, such as device drivers in their operat-
ing systems. For example, they can modify a graphics 
driver to make a wall transparent so that they can see 
through it, locating other players who are supposed to 
be hidden behind it. This is the so-called wall hack, a 
popular cheat in some online games.
G. Denying service to peer players. Cheaters can 
gain advantages by denying service to their peer play-
ers. For example, we’ve observed that cheaters can 
delay responses from their opponents by $ooding the 
opponents’ network connection. Other peer players 
would then be cheated into believing that something 
was wrong with the victim’s network connection and 
agree to kick him or her out of the game to avoid stall-
ing the session.
H. Timing cheating.* In some real-time online games, 
cheating players can delay their own moves until they 
know all their opponents’ moves, and thus gain a huge 
advantage.7 This look-ahead cheat is one type of timing 
cheating; other types include the suppress-correct cheat, 
which lets a cheater gain an advantage by purposefully 
dropping update messages at the “right” time.7
I. Compromising passwords. Passwords are often 
key to much of or all the data and authorization play-
ers have in an online game system. By compromising 
a password, a cheater can access the victim’s data and 
authorization in the game. Due to the limitations of 
human memory, some players tend to choose easy-to-
remember passwords, such as phone numbers, birth-
days, or names of friends or family, or common words 
in their native languages. Cheaters can often easily 
guess such weak passwords. 
J. Exploiting lack of secrecy. When game programs 
exchange communication packets in plaintext format, 
cheaters can eavesdrop on these packets and insert, de-
lete, or modify game events or commands transmit-
ted over the network. This form of cheating can also 
result in compromised passwords if players send their 
passwords to the server in plaintext.
K. Exploiting lack of authentication. If no proper 
mechanism is in place for authenticating a game server 
to clients, cheaters can collect many ID-password pairs 
from legitimate players by setting up a bogus game 
server. Similarly, if a proper mechanism doesn’t exist 
for authenticating a client, cheaters can exploit this to 
gain advantages. For example, it’s critical that the sys-
tem reauthenticate players before executing password 
changes for them. Otherwise, when players leave their 
computers temporarily unattended with a game ses-
sion open—in an Internet cafe, for example, which is 
a primary place people in countries such as China and 
Korea play online games—cheaters who can physi-
cally access players’ machines might stealthily change 
the players’ password and exploit that changed pass-
word afterward.
L. Exploiting a bug or loophole. Here, cheaters ex-
ploit a defect in game programs or the game design 
itself without having to modify game code or data. 
Once discovered, such a defect will give knowl-
edgeable players a major advantage. Lucas"lm’s 
Habitat, one of the "rst multi-user virtual environ-
ments, had such a loophole. Due to an inadvertent 
pricing error, people in the game could sell virtual 
items to a pawn shop at a higher price than they paid 
to get them from a vending machine. By shuttling 
back and forth between the vending machine and 
the pawn shop, some players became (virtual) mil-
lionaires overnight.8
M. Compromising game servers. Cheaters can tam-
per with game server programs or change their con-
"gurations once they’ve obtained access to the game 
host systems. Examples of such cheating cases are 
available elsewhere.4
N. Internal misuse. A game operator usually has 
system administrator privileges that insiders—game 
operator employees—can easily abuse. For example, 
they can generate super characters or other valuable 
virtual items by modifying the game database on the 
server side.
We can sum up the latest developments by 
saying that, whereas people for the past 50 
years tried to cheat the system, now they’re 
trying to cheat each other.
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O. Social engineering. Cheaters often attempt to trick 
players into believing something attractive or annoy-
ing has happened to them, requiring the honest play-
ers to enter an ID and password. Many major game 
operators, such as Blizzard, have published guidelines 
on avoiding such scams on their Web sites, implying 
that this kind of cheating has been a real problem.
Atomic vs. Complex Cheats
The list we just presented attempts to be comprehen-
sive, but it isn’t necessarily disjoint, so a given cheat 
might fall into more than one category. Ideally, we 
could de"ne a list of common cheating forms that is 
disjoint, but this has not proved possible.
Although each listed form can be an independent 
cheat, an actual cheating case might be complex and 
involve multiple forms of cheating. For example, the 
Pogo cheat5 involved two dishonest players who col-
lusively abused a voting protocol to gain advantages. 
This was a cheat due to collusion that abused game 
procedure and also exploited a loophole in the game 
system design.
Another example is the hit-and-run cheat that we 
observed in online Go games. Go is a time-critical 
gameplayed between two people. The Go server 
counts the time each player spends in the game, and a 
player who runs out of time automatically loses. Many 
online players choose to play 25 moves in 10 minutes 
or less, and it’s usual for one to play "ve stones in the 
last 10 seconds. So, cheating players can easily defeat 
opponents by timing them out with a well-timed 
$ooding attack. This denies service to peer players, 
and the hit-and-run cheaters can use this timeout cheat 
while also abusing the game procedure as follows.
Some Internet Go services implemented a penalty 
rule to "ght against the escaping cheat: players who 
disconnect themselves will lose their un"nished game 
unless they return to "nish it within a limited period. 
However, a hit-and-run cheater can exploit this rule 
by $ooding one opponent so that the system records 
that this opponent disconnected the game. Then, the 
cheater doesn’t log on again until the penalty period 
has passed. The players can’t "nish that game in time, 
and the opponent automatically loses points for it.
Online Cheating Taxonomy
Our taxonomy for online game cheating is three di-
mensional; as mentioned, we classify cheating via the 
underlying vulnerability, the cheating consequence, 
and the cheating principal. Our classi"cation is in-
tentionally reminiscent of the well-known depend-
ability taxonomy.9,10
Table 1 shows the taxonomy details by vulnerabil-
ity, possible failure, and exploiter (cheating principal), 
respectively. Every cheating form appears at least once 
in each of these categories. 
Vulnerability
Some cheats exploit design inadequacies in game 
systems, and others don’t. For example, cheating by 
exploiting a bug or loophole exploits inadequacies in 
the game design, implementation, or both. However, 
social engineering doesn’t exploit any technical de-
sign inadequacies. We classify the vulnerabilities ex-
ploited via online cheating into two divisions: system 
design inadequacy, which involves a technical design 
$aw that arises during system development, and hu-
man vulnerability, involving those who operate or play 
online games. 
System design inadequacy has two subdivisions: 
inadequacy in the game system and inadequacy in the under-
lying systems. Online games are applications running 
on top of an underlying networking and operating 
system. A cheater can exploit a $aw in a game system, 
a $aw in its underlying networking or operating sys-
tem, or both.
Exploiting misplaced trust, lack of secrecy or au-
thentication, timing cheating, and exploiting a bug 
or design loophole take advantage of technical inad-
equacies in the game system and belong to the "rst 
subdivision. Collusion, abusing the game procedure, 
and exploiting machine intelligence can also ulti-
mately arise from technical design failures in the 
game system, and due to “the inability to foresee all 
the situations the system will be faced with during 
its operational life, or the refusal to consider some of 
them”9 for reasons such as time to market. They also 
belong to the "rst division.
Two common cheating forms—modifying client 
infrastructure and compromising game servers—
belong to the second subdivision. Speci"cally, the for-
mer occurs on the game client side. However, rather 
than exploit the game application itself, it modi"es the 
system infrastructure—for example, a device driver 
that’s part of the operating system. Similarly, a cheater 
compromising a game server usually breaks into it by 
exploiting a $aw in the operating system or network 
protocols on the server side. (A game server program 
might have $aws that cheaters can remotely exploit, 
but we haven’t seen such cases in real life.)
Denying service to peer players usually exploits 
some inherent network layer weakness. However, 
cheaters can also exploit a design inadequacy in the 
game system alone. For example, a cheat that occurred 
in the Firestorm game4 exploited a bu#er-over$ow 
condition in the game program to disconnect all play-
ers. Another example is the so-called “spawn point 
camping” cheat popular in some real-time shooting 
games. A spawn point is a place in the game where 
players create their avatars at the beginning of game-
play (spawning) and recreate the avatar immediate-
ly after its death (respawning). By waiting near the 
spawn point, cheaters can easily kill players as they 
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spawn or respawn and prevent them from joining the 
action. This is indeed a service denial that exploits 
a design inadequacy in the game system. A more 
cautious design could, for instance, protect newly 
(re)spawned players by granting them immunity to 
ammunition for a short period so that they could move 
to a safe place. (During this period, they wouldn’t be 
able to harm other players.) So, this form of cheating 
is included in both subdivisions.
Other cheating forms, such as social engineering, 
password compromising, cheating related to virtual 
assets, and internal misuse, are only marginally related 
to any technical design inadequacy. Instead, the "rst 
three forms largely exploit innocent players’ vulner-
abilities, and the fourth involves game operator vul-
nerability (involving insiders).
Consequence
We base our cheating consequence classi"cation large-
ly on the four traditional computer security aspects: 
con"dentiality (preventing unauthorized information 
disclosure), integrity (preventing unauthorized infor-
mation modi"cation), availability (preventing unau-
thorized information withholding), and authenticity 
(assuring a remote user’s identity regardless of that 
user’s host). A con"dentiality breach results in theft of 
information or possessions, an integrity breach results in 
the improper modi"cation of game characteristics—that is, an 
integrity violation—an availability breach results in ser-
vice denial, and an authenticity breach allows cheaters 
to disguise their identity (also known as a masquerade).
Collusion, compromising passwords, or social en-
gineering can result in information or possession theft 
in a game; exploiting a lack of authentication results 
in a masquerade. Denying service to peer players in-
volves selective service denials, but compromising 
game servers—by modifying client infrastructure 
or via internal misuse—usually involves improperly 
modifying game characteristics, or integrity failure. 
When done only to eavesdrop on communications, 
Table 1. Online game cheating classi"cation.
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A. Exploiting misplaced trust ? ? ? ?
B. Collusion ? ? ? ?
C. Abusing the game procedure ? ? ?
D. Cheating related to virtual assets ? ? ?
E. Exploiting machine intelligence ? ? ?
F. Modifying client infrastructure ? ? ?
G. Denying service to peer players ? ? ? ?
H. Timing cheating ? ? ? ?
I. Compromising passwords ? ? ?
J. Exploiting lack of secrecy ? ? ? ?
K. Exploiting lack of authentication ? ? ?
L. Exploiting a bug or design loophole ? ? ?
M. Compromising game servers ? ? ?
N. Internal misuse ? ? ? ?
O. Social engineering ? ? ?
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exploiting lack of secrecy results in information theft. 
But when a cheater also tries to exploit such stolen in-
formation by inserting, deleting, or modifying game 
events or commands, this form of cheating will also 
cause an integrity violation. Moreover, as shown in the 
previous section, exploiting misplaced trust can lead to 
information theft, an integrity violation, or both.
However, these traditional computer security as-
pects are insu%cient for covering all online game 
cheating’s consequences. For example, neither the 
cheat that exploited the erroneous pricing bug in Hab-
itat or the win-trading collusion in StarCraft violated 
con"dentiality, availability, integrity, or authenticity.
We’ve therefore introduced fairness between peer 
players as an additional aspect for understanding on-
line game cheating; a fairness breach results in a fair-
ness violation. Abusing the game procedure, exploiting 
a bug or design loophole, exploiting machine intel-
ligence, or cheating related to virtual assets can all 
result in a fairness violation. As the win-trading case 
demonstrates, collusion can also result in a fairness 
violation. Moreover, timing cheating usually involves 
improperly modifying game characteristics and leads 
directly to a fairness violation.
Cheating Principal
A player can cheat single-handedly in either single- 
or multiplayer online games, whereas in multiplayer 
games, two or more players can collaborate to cheat. 
Furthermore, a player can also collude with an insider 
the game operator employs. The cheating principal’s 
identity is the third dimension in our classi"cations, 
and it provides a way to distinguish cooperative cheats 
from their independent counterparts.
The cooperative division includes two subdivisions: 
multiple players covers cheats, such as collusion, that 
require two or more players cooperatively, whereas 
operator and player accommodates cheating committed 
by at least one player and an insider—this typically 
involves collusion and game-speci"c internal misuse.
The independent division also includes two sub-
divisions: game operator covers cheating related to in-
ternal misuse, in which no collusion between a player 
and insider is involved. One example is an insider 
who’s also a player. (As we discuss in our previous 
work,5 house cheating that a game operator alone 
orchestrates can also occur; however, it’s beyond the 
online cheating de"nition we use in this article.) 
Single player accommodates all cheating forms that a 
player can commit single-handedly. 
Discussion
Our taxonomy brings out a systematic view of 
online cheating from which we can make several 
observations. 
First, online cheaters have exploited vulnerabilities 
in both computer systems and humans involved with 
the games. Cheaters can exploit both design inade-
quacies in game systems and weaknesses in their un-
derlying system infrastructures. They can also exploit 
innocent players and corrupt insiders. 
Second, the cheating principal classi"cation shows 
that one player independently can commit most cur-
rent game cheating but that some cheating involves 
collusion with peer players or an insider. We can "nd 
security breaches from a single user or due to user and 
insider cooperation in many contexts. However, it ap-
pears that with the possible exception of online auc-
tions, collusion between peer users in other contexts 
isn’t as serious a problem as it is in online games.
Third, the consequence classi"cation demonstrates 
that cheating is, in fact, largely due to various secu-
rity failures. We can see this more clearly by examin-
ing the distribution of each common cheating form 
in the orthogonal dimensions of vulnerabilities and 
consequences. Table 2 constructs this distribution ma-
trix, with vulnerability and consequence displayed in 
rows and columns, respectively, and cheating forms 
represented with the labels we assigned in a previous 
section. The matrix clearly shows that most types of 
online game cheats involve information theft, im-
properly modifying game characteristics, or fairness 
violations, and that they largely exploit $aws in the 
game systems.
As a result of our taxonomic analysis using Table 
2, we were able to correct a mistake in a previous ver-
sion of this article—namely, we found that we missed 
a type of service denial cheating that exploits design 
inadequacies only in the game system. 
We can also use Table 2 to suggest novel forms 
Table 2. Distribution of observed cheating forms in the vulnerability–consequence matrix.
 VULNERABILITY
CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 
THEFT
SERVICE 
DENIAL
INTEGRITY 
FAILURE MASQUERADE
FAIRNESS 
VIOLATION
Design inadequacy in the game system A, B, J G A K C, E, H, L
Design inadequacy in the underlying systems G F, M
Vulnerability in player I, O D
Vulnerability in insider N
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of cheating that will likely occur in the future. For 
example, cheats that lead to masquerade, informa-
tion theft, or fairness violations and that occur due to 
design inadequacies in their underlying systems will 
probably occur in the future, although we can’t yet 
know how they will manifest themselves.
W e’ve found that cheating in online games is due largely to various security failures. However, the 
four traditional aspects of security are insu%cient to 
explain these cheats and their consequences. Instead, 
fairness becomes a vital additional aspect. 
Fairness and its enforcement also appear to be a 
proper perspective for understanding security’s over-
all role in applications such as online games. On the 
one hand, fair play is essential to any game, and online 
gaming is no exception. Fairness should be an inherent 
concern in its design. On the other hand, online play-
ers usually don’t know each other and are often scat-
tered across di#erent physical locations. So, the social 
structures preventing or discouraging cheating in the 
nonelectronic world are no longer in place for online 
games. Instead, security (together with other technical 
means) becomes essential to enforcing fairness. 
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